

Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 227336 TOSEC 270101

FOR LORD ONLY FROM BARTHOLOMEW

E.O. 11652: GDS ; TAGS: OVIP(KISSINGER,H.A.),UNGA,PARM

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S UNGA SPEECH - NON-PROLIFERATION SECT.

REF: SECTO 27009, SECTO 27013

1. THE NON-PROLIFERATION PART OF THE UNGA SPEECH HAS BEEN REDRAFTED AS YOU REQUESTED TO FIT INTO THE DISCUSSION OF COMMUNITY AND NEW ISSUES, STARTING AFTER PARAGRAPH 1, PAGE 56. IT IS DESIGNED TO CAPTURE THE MORE POSITIVE, NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ASPECT OF OUR POLICIES IN VIEW OF THE AUDIENCE. WE HAVE BRACKETED THE REFERENCES TO FUEL POOLING AND PLUTONIUM CONTROL IN PARTICULAR (PARAS 9 AND 10-11) BECAUSE THESE WILL BE THE MOST SENSITIVE TO PENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS, BUT WE ASSUME THAT ALL OF THIS WILL BE REVIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FORUM AND CONTENT THE PRESIDENT EVENTUALLY CHOOSES FOR HIS NUCLEAR POLICY MESSAGE.

2. WE HAVE ALSO BRACKETED PARA 4, WHICH I VIEW AS OVERLY DEFENSIVE AND LEADING WITH THE CHIN, SINCE IT DRAMATIZES THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE US AND MOST OTHER CONFIDENTIAL

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NUCLEAR POWERS. OTHERS, HOWEVER, FEEL THAT WE SHOULD MEET NNWS ACCUSATIONS OF US HYPOCRISY HEAD-ON AND FEEL THAT THIS IS A PUNCHY LEAD-IN TO THE SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPH. FINALLY, MYRON KRATZER REMAINS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO

MENTIONING THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK (PARA 10) BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE USG STUDY AND THE LEGAL AND POLICY DIFFICULTIES OF DELEGATING NUCLEAR DECISION-MAKING TO THIRD PARTIES OR COUNTRIES. YOU WILL RECALL, HOWEVER, THAT THE SECRETARY COMMENDED THIS CONCEPT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE BASIS OF DETAILED STATE DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, AND I SUGGEST THAT WE RETAIN THIS SECTION PENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECISION.

3. I ALSO SUGGEST THAT YOU CONSIDER REPLACING THE LAST SENTENCE ON PAGE 22 WITH THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH:

"IT MAY OR MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US EVER TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ENTIRELY. BUT THOSE WHO FOR SO MANY YEARS HAVE POSSESSED VAST NUCLEAR ARSENALS, AND WHO HAVE LIVED WITH THE SPECTER OF DIRECT NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THEMSELVES, HAVE A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEIR LONG TERM GOAL, AS LEVELS ARE REDUCED, SHOULD BE TO MAINTAIN A STABLE BALANCE OF DETERRENCE SO THAT THE POSSIBILITY BECOMES MORE AND MORE REMOTE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL EVER BE USED."

4. KALICKI DRAFTED WITH IO(NEIDLE).C,PM, AND OES CLEARED.

5. NON-PROLIFERATION SECTION FOLLOWS.

6. BEGIN TEXT - AT THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN THESE

PROBLEMS OF SECURITY AND INTERDEPENDENCE IS THE

IMPERATIVE NEED TO CONTROL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

AGAIN THE WORLD FACES A PARADOX: COUNTRIES ARE TURNING

INCREASINGLY TO NUCLEAR POWER AS A SOURCE OF ENERGY

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FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS. BUT ITS UNRESTRAINED SPREAD

RAISES THE STARK THREAT OF PROLIFERATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

AND THE RELATED RISKS OF ACCIDENTS, BLACKMAIL, THEFT,

TERRORISM AND USE IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS. ALL NATIONS

THUS SHARE AN INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

-- COULD ANY COUNTRY FEEL SECURE, IF IT COULD BE

THREATENED WITH NUCLEAR ATTACK NOT MERELY FROM ONE
OR TWO DIRECTIONS, BUT FROM A GREAT MANY DIRECTIONS?
-- COULD EVEN THE WEALTHIER COUNTRIES DEFEND
THEMSELVES ADEQUATELY IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, MUCH
LESS COUNTRIES STILL STRUGGLING WITH THEIR DEVELOPMENT?
-- WOULD ANY COUNTRY BE FREE FROM FUNDAMENTAL
DISTORTIONS IN ITS WAY OF LIFE, AS MASSIVE EFFORTS
WERE MOUNTED TO KEEP UP?

7. THESE FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS MUST NOT BE
BRUSHED ASIDE BY EVER BELIEVING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO
ADD TO THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR POWERS BY ONE -- AND ONLY
ONE. ANY GOVERNMENT WHICH HOPES THAT THE DOOR TO THE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL CAN BE CLOSED AS SOON AS IT
IS INSIDE IS DELUDING ITSELF.
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8. A COUNTRY CHOOSING NOW TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
-- WHICH ARE TECHNICALLY EQUIVALENT TO WEAPONS -- MUST
THEREFORE ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY NOT ONLY FOR ITS OWN
ACTIONS BUT FOR ENCOURAGING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TO
A GREAT MANY COUNTRIES THEREAFTER. THAT WILL BE AN
AWESOME BURDEN.

(9. THE QUESTION MAY BE RAISED: IS THIS A HYPOCRITICAL
POSTURE FOR THE NATION WHICH FIRST ACQUIRED AND STILL
MAINTAINS NUCLEAR WEAPONS? I STATE THE ANSWER CATEGORI-
CALLY. IT IS NOT.)

10. THE UNITED STATES DEVELOPED NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING

THE GREATEST CATAclysm OF GLOBAL WAR IN HISTORY. LET
NO ONE ARGUE THAT WHAT WAS DONE WHILE THE NATIONS OF
THE WORLD WERE LOCKED IN A LIFE AND DEATH STRUGGLE
SHOULD BE A PRECEDENT FOR WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN
TIMES OF PEACE -- AND WHEN THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY
FOR BUILDING A RATIONAL AND COOPERATIVE WORLD ORDER.
WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO
DO BETTER IN THE FUTURE.

11. THE UNITED STATES, FOR ITS PART, ACCEPTS THAT THE
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NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS SHOULD SHOW BY THEIR OWN EXAMPLE
THAT THEY ALSO DESIRE TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM THE
NUMBER OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES ON THIS PLANET. IT HAS
NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO PROCEED AS RAPIDLY TOWARD NUCLEAR
REDUCTIONS AS ALL WOULD DESIRE. BUT PROGRESS WILL
BECOME FAR MORE DIFFICULT -- PERHAPS EVEN IMPOSSIBLE -- BY
THE EMERGENCE OF MORE NUCLEAR POWERS.

12. THE WORLD COMMUNITY MUST THEREFORE ACT DECISIVELY
AGAINST THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES -- AND NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITIES. WE URGE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE
ADHERENCE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND THE
COMPREHENSIVE ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
BY NON-PARTIES. THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NUCLEAR
MATERIALS, WHETHER IN USE, STORAGE OR TRANSFER, MUST BE
INCREASED. THE IAEA MUST RECEIVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF ALL
NATIONS IN MAKING ITS SAFEGUARDS AS EFFECTIVE AND AS

RELIABLE AS POSSIBLE. ANY POTENTIAL VIOLATOR OF IAEA
SAFEGUARDS MUST UNDERSTAND THE IMMEDIATE AND ADVERSE
IMPACT OF SUCH A SERIOUS AFFRONT TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS
ON BOTH ITS NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND ITS OVERALL
RELATIONSHIPS.
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13. UNFORTUNATELY, ADHERENCE TO SAFEGUARDS IS NECESSARY
BUT NOT SUFFICIENT FOR GUARANTEEING THAT NUCLEAR
COMMERCE REMAINS PEACEFUL. AT THE HEART OF THE NUCLEAR
PARADOX IS THE FACT THAT SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES
FOR ENRICHING URANIUM AND PRODUCING PLUTONIUM CAN LEAD
DIRECTLY TO A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. COUNTRIES
SEEKING TO ACQUIRE SUCH FACILITIES UNDER NATIONAL
CONTROL, IN DISREGARD OF ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS AND
MILITARY TENSIONS, MUST RECOGNIZE THE SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR ACTIONS -- WHETHER OR NOT THESE
IMPLICATIONS WERE INTENDED. OTHERS CANNOT BE BLAMED
FOR DRAWING THE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES FROM SUCH
CIRCUMSTANCES.

14. NUCLEAR CONSUMERS AND SUPPLIERS SHOULD THEREFORE
JOINTLY SEEK SAFER AND MORE RELIABLE ALTERNATIVES TO
THE FURTHER TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES.
WHERE SUCH FACILITIES ARE ALREADY AVAILABLE, THEY
SHOULD BE USED TO GUARANTEE THE NUCLEAR FUEL NEEDS OF
ALL CONSUMERS. IN THIS REGARD, MY GOVERNMENT IS
DETERMINED TO EXPAND ITS CAPACITY TO MEET INTERNATIONAL
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DEMAND FOR NUCLEAR FUEL. IT IS NOW PREPARED TO CONSIDER
WAYS OF (POOLING ITS RESOURCES) WITH OTHER NATIONS
TO ENSURE UNINTERRUPTED AND ECONOMICAL SUPPLY UNDISTORTED
BY COMMERCIAL RIVALRY. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE SHOULD
BE REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING, IN APPROPRIATE
CASES, SUITABLY SITED MULTINATIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO NEW
NATIONAL FACILITIES, IF AND WHEN THESE BECOME REQUIRED,
AND WE COMMEND THE THOROUGH STUDY BEING CONDUCTED BY
THE IAEA IN THIS AREA.

15. WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THE INCREASING DANGER
INHERENT IN THE ACCUMULATION OF PLUTONIUM FORMED IN
NUCLEAR REACTORS AND THE PRESSURE TO BUILD NATIONAL
FACILITIES TO PROCESS AND RECYCLE THIS MATERIAL.
RELIABLE NUCLEAR FUEL ASSURANCES AT LOWER COST ARE A
KEY ELEMENT IN LIMITING THIS PRESSURE. (BUT BEYOND
THIS, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING NEW
APPROACHES TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF PLUTONIUM CONTROL:
-- ESTABLISHING SECURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR STORING
UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES USED REACTOR FUEL OR
SEPARATED PLUTONIUM, IN EXCESS OF CIVIL NUCLEAR NEEDS.
-- EXCHANGING FRESH FOR USED REACTOR FUEL UNDER
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EQUITABLE TERMS, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL STORAGE AND FOR LIMITING
EVENTUAL REPROCESSING TO EXISTING FACILITIES.

-- MOVING TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK
WHICH WOULD COORDINATE NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY, EXCHANGE
AND STORAGE, HELPING TO ENSURE FRESH REACTOR FUEL
SUPPLY AND TO REALIZE ANY EVENTUAL VALUE OF REACTOR
OUTPUT.

16. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH ALL INTERESTED STATES
AND THE IAEA, WHOSE CHARTER PERMITS IT TO ESTABLISH
INTERNATIONAL STORAGE FACILITIES, IN DEVELOPING AND
IMPLEMENTING THESE NEW APPROACHES. TO THIS END, PRESIDENT
FORD HAS DIRECTED THE CONTRIBUTION OF US RESOURCES,
FACILITIES AND READINESS TO STORE OUR OWN EXCESS CIVIL
SPENT FUEL AND PLUTONIUM UNDER IAEA AUSPICES, PENDING
NEED IN OUR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM.)

17. THE PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION DEMANDS CANDOR. IT
CAN PERHAPS BE MANAGED -- BUT ONLY PARTIALLY AND
TEMPORARILY -- BY TECHNICAL MEASURES. IT CAN BE
SOLVED, HOWEVER, IF ALL OF US FACE UP TO THE REALITIES
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OF THE PROBLEM HONESTLY.

18. IT MAY NOT BE EASY FOR ALL TO ACKNOWLEDGE, BUT
IT IS TRUE NEVERTHELESS THAT
-- REGIONAL CONFLICTS WILL NOT BE MADE EASIER TO
RESOLVE, BUT HARDER, BY INTRODUCTION OF A NEW DIMENSION
OF POTENTIAL TO INFLICT MASSIVE DESTRUCTION.
-- INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE WILL NOT BE ENHANCED BY
BUILDING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, A STEP WHICH IS

NOW WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF MANY NATIONS AND THEREFORE

DEMONSTRATES NO TECHNOLOGICAL PREEMINENCE.

-- THE ACQUISITION OF A FEW OR MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

THE RESULT OF UNCONSTRAINED NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, WILL

NOT HELP ANY NATION TO MEET THE REAL CHALLENGES OF THE

FUTURE -- PRODUCING MORE FOOD, IMPROVING HEALTH

CONDITIONS, PROVIDING EDUCATION, ELIMINATING POVERTY.

19. SO LET US CONCENTRATE OUR ENERGIES AND OUR

RESOURCES ON THE GREAT TASKS CONFRONTING ALL NATIONS.

THIS IS WHAT WE MUST DO IF WE ARE TO FASHION A WORLD

STRUCTURE WHICH SERVES THE INTERESTS OF OUR PEOPLES. ROBINSON

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